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George	  Orwell	  is	  probably	  best	  known	  today	  for	  his	  political	  satire	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four.	  It	  is	  
in	  many	   respects	  his	   crowning	  achievement	   in	   so	   far	   as	  his	  writings	  on	   totalitarianism	  are	  
concerned.	  And	  yet	  it	  was	  preceded	  by	  various	  other	  novels	  and	  documentaries,	  along	  with	  
a	  great	  many	  essays,	  that	  continue	  to	  repay	  careful	  reading.	  Indeed	  had	  he	  never	  written	  his	  
final	   book,	   his	   position	   as	   one	   of	   the	   finest	   essayists	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century	   would	  
nevertheless	  have	  been	  secure.	  Politics	  do	  of	  course	  bulk	  large	  in	  his	  work,	  but	  Orwell	  was	  a	  
man	  of	  wide	  interests	  and	  these	  were	  often	  reflected	  in	  the	  subject	  matter	  he	  chose	  to	  write	  
about.	  Amongst	   the	   insightful	   critiques	  of	   imperialism,	   fascism	  and	   Stalinism	  one	   can	   also	  
find	  sound	  advice	  on	  making	  tea,	  an	  affectionate	  portrait	  of	  Charles	  Dickens,	  and	  a	  careful	  
sociological	   analysis	   of	   what	   used	   to	   be	   called	   ‘saucy’	   postcards	   of	   the	   type	   bought	   on	  
seaside	  holidays	   in	  England.	  War	  also	   features	   frequently	   in	  Orwell’s	  writings,	  which	   is	  not	  
surprising	  given	  the	  times	  in	  which	  he	  lived.	  He	  produced,	  inter	  alia,	  a	  powerful	  account	  of	  
his	   experiences	   fighting	   in	   Spain,	   wrote	   a	   series	   of	   competent	   lectures	   on	   tactics	   for	   the	  
British	  Home	  Guard	  (in	  which	  he	  served	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  being	  too	  unhealthy	  
to	  join	  the	  regular	  army)	  and	  provided	  vivid	  portraits	  of	  life	  in	  London	  under	  bombardment	  
by	  German	  rockets.	  
	  	  	  	  	  To	  date,	  however,	  no	  effort	  has	  been	  made	  to	  identify	  the	  general	  character	  of	  Orwell’s	  
thinking	  on	  war	  as	  it	  had	  developed	  by	  the	  1940s.1	  This	  may	  be	  because	  it	  is	  not	  immediately	  
apparent	  that	  he	  did	  think	  about	  war	  in	  this	  way.	  He	  himself	  never	  assembled	  his	  views	  on	  
the	   subject	   in	   one	   place,	   but	   remained	   content	   to	   leave	   them	   scattered	   across	   his	  many	  
writings—often	  on	  what	  were	  ostensibly	   unrelated	   topics.	  Moreover	   because	  many	  of	   his	  
key	  thoughts	  on	  war	  appeared	  in	  short	  essays	  or	  reviews,	  they	  can	  seem	  undeveloped	  when	  
read	  in	  isolation	  one	  from	  the	  other.	  This,	  in	  combination	  with	  his	  confrontational	  style	  (for	  
he	   frequently	  wrote	   in	   response	   to	   positions	  with	  which	   he	   profoundly	   disagreed),	  might	  
lead	  the	  reader	   to	  conclude	  that	  such	  views	  on	  war	   that	  he	  did	  possess	  were	   fragmentary	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and	   negative	   in	   character.	   And	   yet	   a	   different	   picture	   emerges	   should	   one	   care	   to	   hunt	  
across	   the	   breadth	   of	  Orwell’s	  writing,	  which	   is	   a	   (relatively)	  manageable	   task	   these	   days	  
due	  to	  the	  publication	  of	  his	  Complete	  Works	  in	  some	  20	  volumes.2	  This	  painstakingly	  edited	  
collection	   includes	  not	  only	   the	  wealth	  of	  writing	  he	  produced	   for	  publication	  but	  also	  his	  
letters,	   diaries	   and	  wartime	   radio	   broadcasts—some	   3,646	   items	   in	   total.	   As	   such	   it	   is	   an	  
incomparable	  resource	  for	  piecing	  together	  his	  thinking	  about	  war,	  and	  indeed	  many	  other	  
subjects.	   Viewed	   from	   this	  wider	   perspective,	   the	  many	   fragments	   cohere	   readily	   enough	  
into	  a	  clearer	  picture.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Orwell,	  it	  emerges,	  was	  not	  much	  interested	  in	  the	  technical	  aspects	  of	  war	  and	  had	  little	  
to	  say	  about	  weapons	  and	  tactics	  beyond	  his	  prescriptions	  for	  the	  Home	  Guard.	  Nor	  did	  he	  
contribute	   to	   the	   debates	   surrounding	   the	   operational	   employment	   of	   tanks	   and	   aircraft,	  
which	  the	  likes	  of	  Basil	  Liddell	  Hart	  and	  J.	  F.	  C.	  Fuller	  stirred	  up	  during	  the	  interwar	  period.	  
Instead,	   his	   concerns	  were	   chiefly	  with	   the	   relationship	   between	  war	   and	   politics.	   Orwell	  
was	  at	  pains	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  politics	  ultimately	  rests	  on	  the	  will	  and	  ability	  to	  employ	  
force	  in	  its	  defence,	  and	  that	  the	  scale	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  violence	  required	  reflects	  the	  depth	  
of	  the	  dispute	  between	  belligerents.	  It	  was	  on	  this	  basis	  that	  he	  advocated	  the	  prosecution	  
of	   total	   war	   against	   Nazi	   Germany,	   despite	   the	   various	   risks	   this	   entailed.	   Those	   who	  
rejected	   this	   necessary	   evil	   were,	   he	   maintained,	   guilty	   of	   allowing	   their	   squeamishness	  
about	   violence	   to	  distort	   their	   reasoning,	   or	   dangerously	  naïve	   about	   the	   threat	  posed	  by	  
Hitler.	   Orwell	   was,	   in	   other	   words,	   very	   much	   interested	   in	   matters	   of	   strategy	   and	   the	  
qualities	  required	  for	  sound	  strategic	  decision-­‐making.	  
	  	  	  	  	  As	  such,	  there	  are	  close	  connections	  with	  Orwell’s	  thinking	  about	  wider	  political	  matters.	  
Like	  others	  of	  his	  generation	  he	  was	  both	  unconvinced	  by	  (if	  not	  entirely	  unsympathetic	  to)	  
the	  idealism	  of	  the	  1930s,	  and	  alarmed	  by	  the	  subsequent	  emergence	  of	  realist	  alternatives.	  
As	  such	  his	  writing	  shared	  something	  in	  common	  with	  contemporaneous	  academic	  debates	  
about	  the	  nature	  of	  international	  relations.	  He	  was	  unfamiliar	  with	  the	  specialist	  literature,	  
but	  read	  widely	  amongst	  the	  public	  intellectuals	  of	  his	  day	  who	  wrote	  on	  political	  matters.	  In	  
the	  likes	  of	  British	  philosopher	  C.	  E.	  M.	  Joad,	  he	  detected	  a	  naïve	  faith	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  reason	  
to	  regulate	  human	  affairs	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  universal	  hedonic	  calculus.3	  And,	  at	  the	  other	  
end	  of	   the	  scale,	  he	  was	  particularly	  exercised	  by	   the	  US	  writer	   James	  Burnham	  whom	  he	  
charged	  with	  putting	  the	  competition	  for	  power	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  his	  political	  analysis.4	  Orwell	  
himself	  steadfastly	  maintained	  that	  politics	  ultimately	  rests	  on	  force,	  whilst	  also	  denouncing	  
claims	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  it	  should	  only	  be	  about	  force.	  In	  such	  matters,	   it	  was	  necessary	  to	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steer	  a	  course	  between	  two	  unsatisfactory	  extremes,	  cleaving	  whole-­‐heartedly	  to	  neither	  of	  
them.	  
	  	  	  	  	  With	  Britain	  at	  war,	  questions	  of	  military	  strategy	  brought	  such	  tensions	  into	  sharp	  focus	  
for	   Orwell.	   Although	   wars	   could	   hardly	   be	   conducted	   on	   idealist	   principles,	   slavish	  
adherence	   to	   the	   dictates	   of	   realism	   risked	   opening	   the	   door	   to	   totalitarianism.	   It	   paid,	  
therefore,	  to	  be	  clear	  about	  why	  one	  was	  fighting,	  and	  about	  what	  this	  entailed	  in	  terms	  of	  
military	  effort	  and	  associated	  risks.	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  develop	  these	  points	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
arguments	   Orwell	   made:	   (1)	   against	   pacifism,	   and	   (2)	   in	   support	   of	   the	   area	   bombing	   of	  
German	   cities,	   along	   with	   his	   criticism	   of	   the	   more	   restrained	   strategic	   prescriptions	   for	  
fighting	  Germany	  advanced	  by	  (3)	  H.	  G.	  Wells	  and	  (4)	  Liddell	  Hart.	  
	  
Politics,	  war	  and	  pacifism	  
According	  to	  the	  poet	  Herbert	  Read,	  Orwell’s	  profound	  humanitarianism	  left	  him	  conflicted	  
on	  the	  question	  of	  war.	  ‘Consistently	  he	  would	  have	  been	  a	  pacifist,	  but	  he	  could	  not	  resist	  
the	  Quixotic	   impulse	   to	   spring	   to	  arms	   in	  defence	  of	   the	  weak	  or	  oppressed.’5	  This	   is	  only	  
partly	   correct.	   The	   humanitarian	   impulse	   was	   undoubtedly	   strong	   in	   Orwell,	   and	   there	   is	  
likewise	  a	  touch	  of	  Cervantes	  to	  his	  exploits	  during	  the	  Spanish	  Civil	  War.	  Nevertheless,	  his	  
attitude	   towards	   war	   per	   se	   rested	   on	   intellectual	   as	   opposed	   to	   emotional	   foundations.	  
More	   specifically,	   his	   analysis	   of	   politics	   left	   him	   in	   no	   doubt	   that	   war	   is	   sometimes	   a	  
regrettable	  necessity	  that	  must	  not	  be	  shirked	  if	  worse	  fates	  are	  to	  be	  avoided.	  There	  is,	  he	  
maintained,	  an	  intimate	  link	  between	  politics	  and	  force	  such	  that	  one	  is	  not	  possible	  without	  
the	   other.	  Whilst	   society	   routinely	   operates	   through	   the	   ‘good	  will	   of	   common	  men’	   this	  
alone	  cannot	  be	  expected	  to	  preserve	  it	  for	  very	  long.	  A	  willingness	  and	  ability	  to	  use	  force	  
are	  also	  necessary	  if	  aggression	  is	  to	  be	  resisted.	  Indeed	  a	  ‘government	  which	  refused	  to	  use	  
violence	   in	   its	   own	  defence	  would	   cease	  almost	   immediately	   to	  exist,	   because	   it	   could	  be	  
overthrown	   by	   any	   body	   of	   men,	   or	   even	   any	   individual,	   that	   was	   less	   scrupulous.’6	  The	  
same	  point	  also	  pertains	  to	  relationships	  between	  states.	  Independence,	  Orwell	  maintained,	  
requires	  the	  ability	  to	  resist	  external	  aggression	  by	  means	  of	  war,	  which	  in	  turn	  demands	  the	  
capacity	  to	  manufacture	  large	  numbers	  of	  the	  latest	  weapons.7	  Otherwise	  a	  state	  cannot	  be	  
free	   from	   the	   threat	   of	   subjugation.	   Ultimately,	   therefore,	   every	   polity	   rests	   on	   coercion,	  
even	  if	  this	  is	  not	  apparent	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  Consequently	  by	  accepting	  government,	  and	  the	  
protection	   it	   confers	   on	   society,	   the	   citizens	   of	   a	   state	   must,	   on	   grounds	   of	   consistency,	  
accept	   the	   legitimacy	   of	  war—in	   principle	   and	   sometimes	   in	   fact	   also.	   Thus,	  whatever	   he	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personally	   felt	   about	   war,	   the	   logic	   of	   its	   necessity	   was	   the	   compelling	   point	   for	   Orwell.	  
Personal	  distaste	  needed	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  if	  present,	  and	  then	  set	  aside.	  
	  	  	  	  	  It	  was	  on	  this	  basis	  that	  Orwell	  took	  issue	  with	  the	  pacifist	  intellectuals	  of	  his	  day,	  whom	  
he	  criticized	  for	   lacking	  ‘the	  intellectual	  courage	  to	  think	  their	  thoughts	  down	  to	  the	  roots’	  
with	   the	   result	   that	   their	   squeamishness	   about	   violence	   was	   allowed	   to	   obscure	   the	  
problematic	  realities	  of	  their	  position.8	  For	  one	  thing	  pacifists	  who	  looked	  down	  their	  noses	  
at	   the	  unpleasant	  business	  of	  war,	  all	   the	  while	  accepting	   the	  protection	  of	   the	  state	   they	  
lived	   in,	   were	   behaving	   hypocritically.	   By	   refusing	   to	   dirty	   their	   hands,	   they	  were	   passing	  
responsibility	   for	   their	   security	   onto	   others	  whilst	   denigrating	   their	   efforts	   in	   the	   process.	  
They	  were,	  as	  Kipling	  had	  put	  it,	  ‘making	  mock	  of	  uniforms	  that	  guard	  you	  while	  you	  sleep’.9	  
To	  avoid	  such	  charges	  pacifists	  would	  need	  to	  renounce	  the	  social	  contract	  and	  step	  outside	  
the	  state,	  which	  was	  something	  they	  could	  not	  do.10	  
	  	  	  	  	  Moreover,	  as	  British	  citizens	  it	  was	  logically	  impossible	  for	  pacifists	  to	  adopt	  a	  position	  of	  
neutrality	   in	   a	   war	   with	   Germany.	   Refusing	   military	   service,	   he	   argued,	   was	   ‘objectively	  
speaking’	   tantamount	   to	   striking	   a	   blow	   for	   Nazism,	   just	   as	   a	   German	   pacifist	   would	  
effectively	   be	   striking	   a	   blow	   for	   Britain.11	  In	  war	   (as	   Clausewitz	   had	   observed),	  what	   one	  
side	   neglects	   to	   do	   redounds	   to	   the	   other’s	   advantage—although	   in	   this	   case	  Orwell	   was	  
evidently	  drawing	  on	  his	  own	  past	  experience	  as	  an	  imperial	  police	  officer.	  Just	  such	  a	  line	  of	  
reasoning	   had,	   he	   maintained,	   previously	   led	   British	   officials	   to	   conclude	   that	   Gandhi’s	  
renunciation	   of	   violence	   as	   a	   means	   of	   securing	   Indian	   independence	   was	   beneficial	   to	  
imperial	  rule.	   ‘Strictly	  speaking,	  as	  a	  Nationalist,	  he	  was	  an	  enemy,	  but	  since	  in	  every	  crisis	  
he	  would	  exert	  himself	   to	  prevent	   violence—which,	   from	   the	  British	  point	  of	   view,	  meant	  
preventing	  any	  effective	  action	  whatever—he	  could	  be	  regarded	  as	  “our	  man”’.12	  
	  	  	  	  	  Of	   course	   this	   zero-­‐sum	   logic	  mattered	   only	   if	  meaningful	   distinctions	   existed	   between	  
the	  two	  belligerents,	  and	  certain	  pacifists	  claimed	  there	  was	  nothing	  to	  choose	  between	  the	  
coercive	   practices	   of	   states	   like	   imperial	   Britain	   and	   Nazi	   Germany.	   In	   his	   controversial	  
wartime	   novel,	   No	   Such	   Liberty,	   the	   anarchist	   Alex	   Comfort	   portrayed	   a	   hapless	   young	  
doctor	  who	  escapes	  Germany	  only	  to	  suffer	  all	  manner	  of	  misfortunes	  at	   the	  hands	  of	   the	  
British	   authorities.13	  Although	   the	   British	   are	   not	  wilfully	   cruel,	   a	   combination	   of	   fear	   and	  
poor	  organization	  renders	  the	  practice	  of	   internment	  a	  frightful	  one	  that	  breaks	   its	  victims	  
morally	   as	   well	   as	   physically.	   In	   his	   book	   review	   for	   the	   pacifist	   journal	   Adelphi,	   Orwell	  
understood	  Comfort	   to	  be	  arguing	   that	   the	   choice	  between	  wartime	  Germany	  and	  Britain	  
was	   no	   real	   choice	   at	   all.	   The	   implication	   here,	   therefore,	  was	   that	   by	  witholding	  military	  
service	  the	  pacifist	  was	  not	  unwittingly	  serving	  the	  cause	  of	  evil.	  By	  way	  of	  response,	  Orwell	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allowed	  that	  all	  states	  are	  necessarily	  coercive	  in	  some	  degree,	  but	  he	  nevertheless	  declared	  
it	   wrong	   to	   argue	   that	   there	  was	   nothing	   to	   choose	   between	   them	   in	   this	   regard.	   British	  
internment	  camps	  were	  not	  in	  the	  same	  league	  as	  Germany’s	  concentration	  camps;	  the	  lack	  
of	   refugee	   flows	   into	   Germany	   made	   that	   clear	   enough.14	  And	   although	   it	   was	   easy	   to	  
criticize	   British	   democracy	   for	   its	   many	   real	   hypocrisies,	   efforts	   to	   equate	   it	   with	   Nazism	  
rested	  on	  the	  spurious	  argument	  ‘that	  a	  difference	  of	  degree	  is	  not	  a	  difference.’15	  If	  secret	  
police	  did	  actually	  operate	  in	  Britain	  then	  nobody	  was	  afraid	  of	  them,	  and	  a	  journalist	  such	  
as	  Orwell	  could	  say	  what	  he	  wished	  and	  ‘safely	  ignore	  their	  presence.’16	  Indeed	  the	  fact	  that	  
a	  British	  pacifist	  was	   free	   to	  criticize	  his	  own	  country,	  whereas	  a	  German	  pacifist	  was	  not,	  
demonstated	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  political	  freedom	  each	  state	  permitted	  differed	  sufficiently	  
to	  make	  relative	  judgements	  possible,	  and	  to	  make	  choosing	  sides	  politically	  meaningful.	  
I	   know	   enough	   of	   British	   imperialism	   not	   to	   like	   it,	   but	   I	   would	   support	   it	   against	  
Nazism	  or	  Japanese	  imperialism,	  as	  the	  lesser	  evil.	  Similarly	  I	  would	  support	  the	  USSR	  
against	   Germany	   because	   I	   think	   the	   USSR	   cannot	   altogether	   escape	   its	   past	   and	  
retains	   enough	   of	   the	   original	   ideas	   of	   the	   Revolution	   to	   make	   it	   a	   more	   hopeful	  
phenomenon	  than	  Nazi	  Germany.17	  
Orwell	  likewise	  expressed	  a	  clear	  preference	  for	  America	  over	  Russia,	  despite	  his	  belief	  that	  
such	   an	   alignment	   would	   probably	   preserve	   capitalism	   in	   Britain.	   This	   was	   a	   major	  
concession	   for	   a	   socialist	   intimately	   familiar	   with	   the	   chronic	   poverty	   of	   the	   1930s.18	  But	  
choosing	  sides,	  he	  observed,	  always	  involves	  a	  compromise	  with	  one’s	  principles.	  In	  politics	  
there	   are	   no	   wholly	   good	   options—only	   shades	   of	   evil—and,	   try	   as	   they	   might,	   pacifists	  
cannot	  escape	  politics.	  
	  	  	  	  	  A	   more	   troubling	   line	   of	   argument	   for	   Orwell	   was	   that	   the	   degree	   of	   military	   effort	  
required	   to	   defeat	   Nazi	   Germany	   risked	   destroying	   British	   democracy.	   Many	   liberals	   and	  
pacifists	  alike	  were	  concerned	  that	  the	  war	  would	  become	  increasingly	  ‘total’	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  
demands,	  eventually	  dominating	  all	   areas	  of	  national	   life	  and	  comprehensively	  militarizing	  
British	   society	   in	   the	   process.	   Fighting,	   in	   other	   words,	   would	   ultimately	   foster	   the	   same	  
fascistic	   values	   at	   home	   that	   the	  war	  was	   intended	   to	   eradicate	   abroad.	   In	   a	   subsequent	  
argument	  with	  Orwell	  in	  the	  pages	  of	  Partisan	  Review,	  Alex	  Comfort	  wondered	  whether	  	  
Hitler’s	   greatest	   and	   irretrievable	   victory	   over	   here	   was	   when	   he	   persuaded	   the	  
English	   people	   that	   the	   only	   way	   to	   lick	   Facism	   was	   to	   imitate	   it.	   He	   puts	   us	   in	   a	  
dilemma	  which	  cannot	  be	  practically	  rebutted,	  only	  broken	  away	  from—’If	  I	  win,	  you	  
have	  political	  Fascism	  victorious:	  if	  you	  want	  to	  beat	  me,	  you	  must	  assimilate	  as	  much	  
of	  its	  philosophy	  as	  you	  can,	  so	  that	  I	  am	  bound	  to	  win	  either	  way.’19	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The	   poet	  D.	   S.	   Savage	   (whose	   name	  belied	   his	   nature)	   likewise	   pointed	   to	   the	   same	   grim	  
irony	  when	  he	  argued	  that	  by	  opposing	  war,	  the	  pacifist	  ‘might	  therefore	  be	  called	  the	  only	  
genuine	  opponent	  of	  Fascism.’20	  
	  	  	  	  	  Orwell	   appreciated	   the	   pressures	   that	   war	   could	   place	   on	   democractic	   practices.	   In	  
Homage	   to	   Catalonia	   he	   had	   previously	   noted	   that	   ‘war	   suffers	   a	   kind	   of	   progressive	  
degradation	  with	   every	  month	   that	   it	   continues,	   because	   such	   things	   as	   individual	   liberty	  
and	   a	   truthful	   press	   are	   simply	   not	   compatible	   with	   military	   efficiency.’ 21 	  Still,	   in	   his	  
judgement,	   waging	   war	   against	   foreign	   fascism	   did	   not	   entail	   an	   inevitable	   descent	   into	  
fascism	  at	  home.	  The	   relationship	  was	  not	   a	  mechanical	  one,	   and	  much	  depended	  on	   the	  
more	   fundamental	   political	   characteristics	   of	   the	   country	   in	   question.	   To	   be	   sure,	   the	  
demands	   of	   total	   war	   brought	   with	   them	   an	   increased	   element	   of	   state	   compulsion	   in	  
Britain.	  Conscription	  into	  the	  armed	  forces	  and	  the	  coal	  mines	  were	  obvious	  examples	  in	  this	  
regard,	   as	   were	   government	   intervention	   in	   industrial	   production	   and	   the	   rationing	   of	  
foodstuffs.	  
	  	  	  	  	  But	   despite	   all	   this,	   he	   believed	   there	   remained	   a	   critical	   difference	   between	   the	  
situations	  in	  Britain	  and	  Germany.	  State	  control	   in	  Britain	  remained	  something	  imposed	  on	  
individuals	   from	   the	  outside.	   There	  was	   no	   thorough-­‐going	   totalitarian	   attempt	   to	   abolish	  
the	   individual	   from	  within	  by	   controlling	  what	   could	  be	   thought.	   This,	   argued	  Orwell,	  was	  
because	  of	  the	  particular	  character	  of	  English	  political	  life,	  which	  had	  flourished	  long	  enough	  
to	   acquire	   an	   element	   of	   ‘decency’	   that	   was	   absent	   from	   politics	   in	   the	   new	   totalitarian	  
states.	   The	   centre	   of	   a	   maritime	   empire	   long-­‐protected	   by	   the	   guns	   of	   the	   Royal	   Navy,	  
Britain	  had	  been	  spared	  the	  trauma	  of	  military	  defeat	  and	  revolution	  at	  home.	  It	  therefore	  
retained	  a	  traditional	  political	  elite	  that	  was	  more	  concerned	  with	  outward	  shows	  of	  loyalty	  
than	   inward	   ideological	   conformity.	   For	   their	   part	   the	   British	   people	   lacked	   the	   habit	   of	  
deference	   to	   authority	   that	  would	   permit	   a	  more	   intrusive	   policing.	  Nor	  were	   they	   prone	  
these	  days	  to	  the	  nationalism	  of	  the	  jingo,	  which	  had	  featured	  so	  conspicuously	  during	  the	  
previous	  war.	  They	  were	  patriotic—content	  with	  their	  own	  way	  of	  life	  and	  willing	  to	  defend	  
it—but	   not	   interested	   in	   imposing	   it	   on	   others.	   As	   such	   the	   war	   was	   considered	   an	  
unfortunate	  job	  of	  work	  to	  be	  got	  through,	  rather	  than	  an	  opportunity	  for	  aggrandizement	  
at	   the	   expense	   of	   lesser	   sorts.22	  Germany	   was	   not	   therefore	   a	   model	   for	   Britain	   in	   this	  
regard,	  and	  pacifism	  was	  not	  the	  only	  genuine	  alternative	  to	  fascism.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  Orwell’s	  sense	  of	  the	  British	  political	  climate	  was	  sounder	  than	  that	  of	  his	  
pacifist	  opponents.	  Total	  war	  did	  not	   lead	   to	  a	   total	   state.	  During	   the	   summer	  of	  1945	  he	  
himself	  was	  subsequently	  moved	  to	   record	  his	   surprise	  on	   this	  point.	   In	  one	  of	  his	   regular	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letters	  to	  Partisan	  Review	  he	  noted	  that	  the	  prospect	  of	  Britain	  fighting	  for	  almost	  six	  years,	  
without	  sacrificing	  its	  liberal	  inheritance	  in	  the	  process,	  would	  never	  have	  occurred	  to	  him.23	  
But	   his	   political	   instincts	   had	   nevertheless	   proved	   broadly	   correct.	   Under	   pressure	   of	  war	  
many	  liberal	  aspects	  of	  national	  life	  were	  held	  in	  abeyance,	  only	  to	  emerge	  once	  more	  with	  
the	  end	  of	  hostilities.	  In	  many	  respects	  Churchill’s	  personal	  fate	  instantiates	  this	  process,	  the	  
powerful	   and	   charismatic	   war	   leader	   being	   voted	   out	   of	   office	   in	   the	   general	   election	   of	  
1945	  in	  preference	  for	  Atlee’s	  socialist	  vision	  of	  the	  peace.24	  
	  
Bombing	  German	  cities	  
The	  Royal	  Air	  Force’s	  area	  bombing	  of	  German	  cities	  was	  a	  particularly	  controversial	  aspect	  
of	  British	  strategy	  that	  attracted	  vocal	  criticism	  during	  the	  war,	  not	  least	  on	  moral	  grounds.	  
Dissent	   was	   not	   limited	   to	   pacifist	   organizations.	   Public	   figures	   such	   as	   the	   Bishop	   of	  
Chichester	   George	   Bell,	   Gilbert	   Murray	   and	   George	   Bernard	   Shaw	   registered	   their	  
objections.25	  So	  too	  did	  Liddell	  Hart.	  For	  his	  part,	  Orwell	  became	  involved	  in	  this	  controversy	  
when	   he	   responded	   to	   Vera	   Brittain’s	   powerful	   denunication	   of	   the	   bombing	   campaign.	  
Brittain	   had	   served	   as	   a	   volunteer	   nurse	   during	   the	   First	   World	   War	   and	   subsequently	  
became	  a	  well-­‐known	  novelist	  and	  pacifist,	  joining	  the	  Committee	  for	  the	  Abolition	  of	  Night	  
Bombing	  (subsequently	  renamed	  the	  Bombing	  Restrictions	  Committee)	  on	  whose	  behalf	  she	  
wrote	   the	   pamphlet	   Seed	   of	   Chaos.26	  The	   result	   was	   a	   compelling	   polemic.	   British	   and	  
American	   people,	   she	   argued,	   were	   not	   being	   properly	   informed	   about	   the	   terrible	  
consequences	   of	   the	   air	   raids	   carried	   out	   in	   their	   name.	   Euphemistic	   reportage	   of	   the	  
bombing	  (‘softening	  up	  …	  neutralizing	  the	  target	  …	  blanketing	  an	  industrial	  district’)	  served	  
to	  obscure	   the	   true	   scale	  of	   the	  death	  and	  destruction	   that	  was	   regularly	  being	  visited	  on	  
German	  civilians.	  In	  support	  of	  her	  contention	  she	  assembled	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  sources	  that,	  
taken	  together,	  were	  intended	  to	  expose	  these	  costs	  in	  a	  graphic	  manner,	  the	  idea	  being	  to	  
shock	  her	   readers	   into	  a	  new	  sense	  of	   realization	  about	  what	  was	   routinely	  being	  done	   in	  
their	  name.	  If	  they	  were	  willing	  to	  endorse	  such	  terrible	  methods	  of	  warfare,	  she	  continued,	  
what	  did	  this	  augur	  for	  the	  future	  of	  their	  own	  civilization?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Orwell’s	  reply	  to	  Brittain	  appeared	  in	  the	  May	  1944	  issue	  of	  Tribune.	  As	  with	  the	  case	  
of	   pacifism,	   his	   criticism	   was	   that	   objections	   to	   the	   bombing	   owed	   more	   to	   emotional	  
impulses	   than	   to	   reasoned	   argument.	   The	   real	   problem,	   he	   maintained,	   was	   not	   city	  
bombing	  per	  se,	  but	  simply	  the	  barbaric	  nature	  of	  war	  itself.	  The	  idea	  that	  warfare	  should	  be	  
subject	   to	   limitation	  on	  humanitarian	  grounds	  was	  due	   to	  people’s	   tendency	   to	   substitute	  
careful	   thought	  on	   the	  matter	  with	   ‘catchwords’	   such	  as	   ‘killing	  civilians’	  and	   ‘massacre	  of	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women	   and	   children’.	   These,	   he	   contended,	   were	   merely	   bundles	   of	   unexamined	  
assumptions	  that	  did	  not	  stand	  up	  to	  scrutiny.	  As	  far	  as	  civilian	  casualties	  were	  concerned:	  
Why	  is	  it	  worse	  to	  kill	  civilians	  than	  soldiers?	  Obviously	  one	  must	  not	  kill	  children	  if	  it	  
is	  in	  any	  way	  avoidable,	  but	  it	  is	  only	  in	  propaganda	  pamphlets	  that	  every	  bomb	  drops	  
on	  a	  school	  or	  an	  orphanage.	  A	  bomb	  kills	  a	  cross-­‐section	  of	  the	  population;	  but	  not	  
quite	   a	   representative	   selection,	   because	   the	   children	   and	   expectant	   mothers	   are	  
usually	   the	   first	   to	   be	   evacuated,	   and	   some	   of	   the	   young	  men	  will	   be	   away	   in	   the	  
army.	   Probably	   a	   disproportionately	   large	   number	   of	   bomb	   victims	   will	   be	   middle-­‐
aged.	   (Up	   to	   date,	   German	   bombs	   have	   killed	   between	   six	   and	   seven	   thousand	  
children	  in	  this	  country.	  This	  is,	  I	  believe,	  less	  than	  the	  number	  killed	  in	  road	  accidents	  
in	  the	  same	  period.)27	  
As	  for	  supposedly	  more	  legitimate	  ways	  of	  making	  war,	  they	  were	  scarcely	  less	  ghastly	  than	  
city	   bombing.	   Each	   German	   submarine	   sunk	   doomed	   dozens	   of	   young	   men	   to	   death	   by	  
suffocation,	  whilst	  the	  ground	  war	  on	  the	  Russian	  Front	  was	  killing	  off	  tremendous	  numbers	  
of	  soldiers	  on	  a	  more	  or	  less	  continual	  basis.28	  
	  	  	  	  	  Moreover,	  ‘international	  agreements	  to	  ‘limit’	  war	  …	  are	  never	  kept	  when	  it	  pays	  to	  break	  
them.’	  The	  patchy	  record	  of	  self-­‐restraint	  in	  relation	  to	  gas	  warfare	  demonstrated	  that	  this	  
was	  the	  result	  of	  self-­‐interested	  calculation	  rather	  than	  humanitarian	  motives.	  	  
Long	  before	  the	  last	  war	  the	  nations	  had	  agreed	  not	  to	  use	  gas,	  but	  they	  used	  it	  all	  the	  
same.	  This	  time	  they	  have	  refrained,	  merely	  because	  gas	  is	  comparatively	  ineffective	  
in	   a	   war	   of	   movement,	   while	   its	   use	   against	   civilian	   populations	   would	   be	   sure	   to	  
provoke	  reprisals	  in	  kind.	  Against	  an	  enemy	  who	  can’t	  hit	  back,	  e.g.	  the	  Abyssinians,	  it	  
is	  used	  readily	  enough.	  
The	  reality,	  Orwell	  concluded,	  is	  that	  war’s	  barbarity	  is	  a	  reflection	  of	  who	  we	  are,	  and	  only	  
by	   first	   admitting	   to	   our	   barbarism	   can	  we	   hope	   to	  make	   some	   changes	   for	   the	   better.29	  
Anything	  else	  would	  merely	  be	  cosmetic	  in	  character.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Brittain	   responded	   to	   these	  charges	   the	   following	  month,	   taking	  Orwell	   to	   task	   for	  mis-­‐
reading	  her	  position.	   It	  was	  not	  so	  much	  with	  the	  killing	  of	  civilians	  she	  was	  concerned,	  as	  
with	   the	   ‘moral	   deterioration’	   that	   any	   nation	  must	   suffer	   as	   a	   result	   of	   stooping	   to	   such	  
means,	   and	   the	   consequent	   ‘setback	   to	   European	   civilisation	   as	   a	   whole’.	   Furthermore,	  
certain	  restraints	  on	  the	  means	  of	  war	  had	   thus	   far	  been	  observed.	  The	  United	  States	  had	  
not	   yet	   employed	   gas	   against	   Japanese	   troops	   occupying	   defensive	   positions	   on	   Pacific	  
islands.	   Nor	   had	   anyone	   thus	   far	   resorted	   to	   bacteriological	   warfare.	   A	   descent	   into	  
unmitigated	   cruelty	   was	   not,	   therefore,	   the	   inevitable	   outcome	   of	   war,	   and	   attempts	   to	  
ameliorate	   some	  of	   its	  worst	   aspects	  not	  necessarily	  hopeless.30	  Sadly,	  Orwell’s	   pessimism	  
won	  out	  here,	  gas	  being	  employed	  by	  the	  Nazis	  to	  kill	  millions	  of	  civilians.	  The	  Japanese	  also	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employed	   bacteriological	   weapons,	   albeit	   on	   an	   experimental	   scale,	   in	   China	   and	   against	  
Soviet	  troops.31	  The	  world	  at	  war	  was	  a	  harder	  place	  than	  Brittain	  cared	  to	  imagine.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Brittain’s	   assertion	   that	   Orwell	   had	   overlooked	   the	   main	   point	   of	   her	   pamphlet	   also	  
seems	  a	   little	  unfair.	   She	  had	   indeed	   raised	   the	  question	  of	   ‘moral	  deterioration’,	   and	  her	  
choice	  of	  title—Seed	  of	  Chaos—is	  evidently	  an	  allusion	  to	  this	  matter.	  Still,	  by	  far	  the	  most	  
space	  was	  devoted	  to	  documenting	  the	  effects	  of	  bombing	  on	  German	  cities.	  And	  nor	  had	  
she	   responded	   to	   Orwell’s	   principal	   charge	   on	   the	  matter	   of	   unproblematized	   sentiment.	  
‘Why’,	  he	  asked	  in	  a	  second	  letter	  to	  Tribune,	   ‘is	  gas	  or	  bacteriological	  warfare	  worse	  than	  
the	  ordinary	  kind?	  Certainly	  the	  results	  of	  gas	  are	  horrible,	  but	  as	  Miss	  Brittain	  was	  a	  nurse	  
in	   the	   last	  war	   she	  will	   know	  what	   a	   shell	  wound	   in	   the	   intestines	   is	   like.’	   Here,	   in	   other	  
words,	   was	   another	   of	   the	   unexamined	   ‘catchwords’	   that	   featured	   so	   prominently	   in	   the	  
arguments	   of	   those	   who	   opposed	   the	   bombing.	   And	   as	   for	   her	   point	   about	   the	   moral	  
damage	   to	   European	   civilization,	   Orwell	   observed	   that	   it	   did	   not	   take	   into	   account	   the	  
nature	  of	  Nazi	  rule	  in	  Europe,	  which	  was	  already	  ‘based	  on	  the	  truncheon	  and	  the	  machine-­‐
gun.’32	  City	  bombing	  was,	   in	  other	  words,	  merely	   a	   component	  of	   total	  war	  and	   therefore	  
created	   the	   same	   form	   of	   strategic	   dilemma	   that	   had	   loomed	   over	   his	   debate	   with	   the	  
pacifists.	  To	  renounce	  bombing	  was	  to	  risk	  leaving	  Europe	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  Hitler’s	  tyranny;	  
to	  continue	  with	  it	  was	  to	  risk	  the	  very	  values	  one	  was	  seeking	  to	  defend.	  There	  was	  no	  self-­‐
evidently	  good	  choice	  here.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Orwell	   attracted	   heartfelt	   criticism	   for	   his	   public	   differences	   with	   Brittain	   and	   the	  
following	  month	  he	  was	  once	  more	  in	  the	  pages	  of	  Tribune,	  noting	  receipt	  of	  various	  letters	  
on	  the	  subject—’some	  of	  them	  quite	  violent	  ones’	  he	  cheerfully	  admitted.33	  Here	  his	  object	  
was	   to	   renew	   his	   dispassionate	   defence	   of	   area	   bombing,	   and	   he	   steadfastly	   refused	   to	  
acknowledge	  any	  significance	   in	  the	  distinction	  his	  detractors	   insisted	  on	  drawing	  between	  
killing	  men	  and	  women,	  denouncing	  it	  as	  ‘sheer	  sentimentality.’	  It	  was	  also,	  he	  now	  argued,	  
a	  distinction	  that	  was	  actually	  harmful	  to	  the	  societies	  that	  observed	  it.	  During	  the	  previous	  
war	  millions	  of	  young	  men	  had	  died	  unmarried,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  their	  nations	  were	  also	  
deprived	  of	  the	  children	  they	  never	  fathered.	  Focusing	  warfare	  on	  the	  killing	  of	  young	  men	  
was,	  therefore,	  rather	  more	  detrimental	  to	  society	  than	  making	  everyone	  a	  target.	  As	  such	  
Orwell	   concluded	   that	  had	   the	  present	  war	   ‘been	  conducted	  …	  with	   flying	  bombs,	   rockets	  
and	  other	   long-­‐range	  weapons	  which	  kill	  old	  and	  young,	  healthy	  and	  unhealthy,	  male	  and	  
female	   impartially,	   it	   would	   probably	   have	   damaged	   European	   civilisation	   somewhat	   less	  
than	  it	  did.’34	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  Orwell	  returned	  once	  again	  to	  the	  subject	  of	  area	  bombing	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  at	  
which	   point	   he	  was	  working	   in	   Europe	   as	   a	   correspondent	   for	   the	  Observer.	   The	   job	   had	  
given	  him	  an	  opportunity	   to	   observe	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   fighting	   at	   first	   hand,	   and	  he	  now	  
confessed	  astonishment	  at	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  damage	  inflicted	  on	  German	  cities,	  which	  was	  
far	   in	   excess	   of	   anything	   the	   Luftwaffe	   had	   previously	   achieved	   against	   Britain.	   ‘To	   walk	  
through	   the	   ruined	   cities	   of	   Germany’,	   he	   declared,	   ‘is	   to	   feel	   an	   actual	   doubt	   about	   the	  
continuity	  of	  civilisation.’	  If	  anything,	  however,	  the	  experience	  seems	  to	  have	  strengthened	  
Orwell’s	  convictions.	  He	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  destruction	  was	  actually	  at	  its	  most	  complete	  
in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  ground	  fighting,	  and	  steadfastly	  maintained	  that	  the	  key	  problem	  was	  not	  
so	  much	  bombing	  as	  the	  ‘frightful	  destructiveness	  of	  modern	  war’	  in	  general.	  
Bombing	  is	  not	  especially	  inhumane.	  War	  itself	  is	  inhumane,	  and	  the	  bombing	  plane,	  
which	  is	  used	  to	  paralyse	  industry	  and	  transport	  rather	  than	  to	  kill	  human	  beings,	  is	  a	  
relatively	   civilised	  weapon.	   ‘Normal’	   or	   ‘legitimate’	   warfare	   is	   just	   as	   destructive	   of	  
inanimate	  objects,	  and	  enormously	  more	  so	  of	  human	  lives	  …	  Moreover,	  a	  bomb	  kills	  
a	  casual	  cross-­‐section	  of	  the	  population,	  whereas	  the	  men	  killed	  in	  battle	  are	  exactly	  
the	  ones	  that	  the	  community	  can	  least	  afford	  to	  lose.35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
This	   latter	   comment	   reflects	   a	   further	   development	   of	   Orwell’s	   position	   on	   the	   problems	  
associated	  with	   restricting	  warfare	   to	   the	  killing	  of	   soldiers.	   In	  his	  view,	   the	   fit	  young	  men	  
who	   had	   perished	   in	   battle	   by	   their	   tens	   of	   thousands	   fell	   into	   exactly	   that	   category	   of	  
people	  who	  would	   be	  most	   valuable	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   reconstruction	   of	   Germany—at	   task	  
that	  would	  subsequently	  be	  necessary	  if	  the	  stricken	  country	  were	  not	  to	  become	  a	  chronic	  
burden	  on	  its	  vanquishers.	  Killing	  soldiers	  was,	  in	  other	  words,	  killing	  society’s	  best	  bet	  for	  a	  
stable	  and	  prosperous	  future.	  And	  callous	  as	  this	  argument	  may	  sound,	  it	  did	  in	  fact	  become	  
an	  established	  part	  of	  the	  grim	  calculus	  underpinning	  postwar	  efforts	  to	  revive	  a	  shattered	  
Europe.	   As	   Tony	   Judt	   would	   later	   observe:	   out	   the	   millions	   of	   refugees	   and	   displaced	  
persons	   created	   by	   the	   war	   ‘European	   states	   were	   interested	   in	   strong	   (male)	   manual	  
workers	  [whereas]	  no-­‐one	  wanted	  older	  people,	  orphans	  or	  single	  women	  with	  children.’36	  
	  	  	  	  	  These	  wartime	  controversies	  confront	  us	  with	  an	  aspect	  of	  Orwell’s	  makeup	  that	   is	  very	  
different	  from	  his	  trademark	  humanitarianism—which	  is	  his	  capacity	  for	  an	  austere	  version	  
of	   consequentialism.	   Ends	   could	  on	  occasion	   go	   a	   long	  way	   towards	   justifying	  means.	   But	  
whatever	   else	   we	   might	   make	   of	   his	   attitudes	   towards	   pacifism	   and	   city	   bombing,	   the	  
relevant	  point	  here	  is	  that	  they	  stemmed	  from	  a	  determination	  to	  think	  matters	  through	  to	  
a	   logical	   conclusion,	   even	   though	   this	   might	   go	   against	   the	   grain	   of	   one’s	   emotional	  
commitments.	  For	  Orwell	  politics	  is	  a	  grim	  business	  of	  compromize	  and	  grey	  choices,	  which	  
we	  cannot	  avoid.	  Politics,	  moreover,	  implies	  the	  possibility	  of	  war	  along	  with	  a	  requirement	  
to	  make	  difficult	  decisions	  about	   the	  use	  of	   force.	   Intuition	   is	  no	  sure	  guide	   in	   this	   regard.	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Rather,	  the	  issues	  demand	  working	  through	  as	  systematically	  as	  possible.	  This	  may	  lead	  us	  to	  
uncomfortable	  conclusions.	  Nevertheless	  for	  Orwell	  this	  process	  is	  both	  instrumentally	  and	  
morally	   superior—by	  dint	  of	   its	   ability	   to	  deliver	   superior	  outcomes—to	   the	  alternative	  of	  
being	  led	  hither	  and	  thither	  by	  one’s	  emotions.	  	  
	  
The	  liberal	  imagination	  
Orwell	  did	  not	  limit	  his	  criticism	  to	  those	  he	  believed	  were	  allowing	  emotion	  to	  cloud	  their	  
reasoning	   on	   strategic	   matters.	   Although	   rational	   deliberation	   might	   lie	   at	   the	   heart	   of	  
effective	  strategy,	  he	  also	  warned	  against	  assuming	  that	  the	  enemy	  reasoned	  in	  accordance	  
with	  one’s	   own	   scale	  of	   values,	   or	   even	   that	   he	  was	   rational	   at	   all.	   It	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	  
one’s	  own	  scrupulously	  interrogated	  position	  on	  any	  question	  of	  war	  will	  necessarily	  find	  its	  
reflection	  in	  the	  adversary’s	  mind.	  Orwell’s	  principal	  target	  in	  this	  regard	  were	  intellectuals	  
whose	   parochial	   brand	   of	   liberalism	   blinded	   them	   to	   the	   atavistic	   allure	   of	   nationalism	  
elsewhere	   in	   the	  world,	   and	   to	   the	  power	  available	   to	   those	  who	  knew	  how	   to	   incite	  and	  
channel	   it	   in	  accordance	  with	   their	  own	  purposes.	   ‘One	  of	   the	  great	  weaknesses	  of	  British	  
and	  American	  political	  thought	  during	  the	  past	  decade’,	  he	  wrote	  in	  1941	  
has	  been	  that	  people	  who	  have	  lived	  all	  their	  lives	  in	  democratic	  or	  quasi-­‐democratic	  
countries	   find	   it	   very	   difficult	   to	   imagine	   the	   totalitarian	   atmosphere	   and	   tend	   to	  
translate	  all	   that	  happens	  abroad	   into	   terms	  of	   their	  own	  experience.	  This	   tendency	  
has	  vitiated	  most	  of	  what	  has	  been	  written	  about	  the	  U.S.S.R.,	  about	  the	  Spanish	  Civil	  
War,	  even	  about	  Nazism.37	  
Preserved	   from	   the	   traumas	   of	   defeat	   and	   revolution	   consequent	   on	   the	   last	   war,	   many	  
liberals	   ‘assumed	   tacitly	   that	   human	   beings	   desire	   nothing	   beyond	   ease,	   security	   and	  
avoidance	  of	  pain.’38	  Moreover	  maximizing	  access	  to	  these	  goods	  was,	  they	  concluded,	  what	  
everyone	  else	  wished	  for	  out	  of	  life.	  For	  Orwell,	  however,	  hedonic	  assumptions	  of	  this	  kind	  
obscured	  the	  unpalatable	  fact	  that	  nationalist	  particularism,	  and	  all	  it	  entailed,	  was	  actually	  
what	  validated	  existence	  for	  many	  people	  living	  in	  unhappier	  places	  than	  the	  British	  Isles.39	  
Liberal	   intellectuals,	   in	   other	   words,	   were	   prone	   to	   lacking	   the	   political	   imagination	  
necessary	  to	  empathize	  with	  the	  broader	  emotional	  climate	  of	  their	  times.	  
	  	  	  	  	  It	  was	   such	   failings,	   claimed	  Orwell,	   that	  had	   led	   so	  many	   to	  underestimate	   the	  danger	  
posed	  by	  fascism—and	  this	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  very	  existence	  demonstrated	  a	  popular	  
‘desire	   to	  avoid	  a	   too-­‐rational	  and	   too	  comfortable	  world.’40	  In	  his	  own	  analysis	  of	  Hitler’s	  
psychology,	   Orwell	   contended	   that	   part	   of	   the	   dictator’s	   power	   lay	   in	   his	   appreciation	   of	  
exactly	   this	  point.	  Most	  people	  will	   not	  be	   inspired	  by	   the	  promise	  of	  an	  easier	  and	  more	  
reasonable	  life.	  They	  may	  wish	  for	  such	  things,	  but	  sometimes	  they	  also	  ‘want	  struggle	  and	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self-­‐sacrifice,	   not	   to	  mention	   drums,	   flags	   and	   loyalty-­‐parades	   …	   Fascism	   and	   Nazism	   are	  
psychologically	   far	   sounder	   than	   any	   hedonistic	   conception	   of	   life.’41	  And	   liberals	  who	   did	  
not	  appreciate	  this	  point	  were	   in	  no	  position	  to	  offer	  practicable	  strategic	  solutions	  to	  the	  
threats	  Britain	  faced.	  	  	  
	  
H.	  G.	  Wells	  
One	  of	  Orwell’s	  principal	  targets	  in	  this	  regard	  was	  H.	  G.	  Wells.	  Orwell	  considered	  Wells	  an	  
important	   public	   intellectual,	   going	   so	   far	   as	   to	   label	   him	   the	   most	   influential	   English-­‐
language	  novelist	  of	  the	  time,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  ‘[t]hinking	  people	  who	  were	  born	  about	  the	  
beginning	  of	  this	  century	  are	  in	  some	  sense	  Wells’s	  own	  creation.’42	  Having	  said	  that,	  he	  also	  
considered	  Wells’s	  political	  outlook	  to	  be	  dangerously	  out	  of	  step	  with	  the	  modern	  world.	  To	  
be	   sure,	   his	   unyielding	   faith	   in	   scientific	   reason	  as	   a	   cure-­‐all	   for	   the	  human	   condition	  had	  
made	   him	   a	   far-­‐sighted	   prophet	   by	   the	   standards	   of	   the	   late-­‐nineteenth	   century.	  
Nevertheless,	  a	  failure	  to	  change	  with	  the	  times	  had	  left	  him	  ill-­‐equipped	  to	  understand	  the	  
political	  complexion	  of	  a	  darker	  era	  that	  involved	  explicitly	  articulated	  efforts	  to	  destroy	  the	  
Enlightenment’s	   legacy.	  Thus	  although	  Orwell	  would	  certainly	  have	  agreed	  with	  Wells	   that	  
war	  ‘without	  clearly	  stated	  war	  aims	  is	  a	  form	  of	  epilepsy	  [the]	  sabotage	  of	  the	  end	  by	  the	  
means’,	  he	  profoundly	  disagreed	  with	  him	  on	  the	  strategic	  specifics	  of	  1941.43	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  that	  year	  Wells	  published	  a	  collection	  of	  widely	  syndicated	  newspaper	  
articles	   in	  book	  form.	  His	  Guide	  to	  the	  New	  World	   formed	  part	  of	  his	  running	  commentary	  
on	   the	   war,	   about	   which	   he	   remained	   optimistic	   as	   far	   as	   British	   prospects	   were	  
concerned.44	  Germany,	   Wells	   argued,	   had	   over-­‐extended	   itself	   the	   previous	   year	   whilst	  
Britain’s	  military	  capacity	  could	  now	  be	  expected	  to	  increase	  as	  a	  result	  of	  incipient	  US	  aid.	  
The	   fall	   of	   France	   had	   been	   due	   as	   much	   to	   French	   weakness	   as	   German	   strength,	   and	  
although	  the	  Luftwaffe	  remained	  a	  menace	  to	  British	  cities	  this	  was	  something	  that	  could	  be	  
addressed	   in	  due	  course	  by	  a	  strengthening	  Royal	  Air	  Force.	   In	   fact,	  Wells	  considered	   that	  
the	  tide	  of	  war	  was	  now	  turning	  against	  Hitler	  and	  that	  Britain	  could	  look	  forward	  to	  victory	  
in	  the	  near	  future.	  Lately,	  however,	  he	  had	  detected	  a	  sinister	  whiff	  of	  conspiracy	  in	  the	  air.	  
Churchill	  was	  warning	  that	  the	  national	  outpouring	  of	  ‘blood	  and	  tears’	  would	  last	  into	  1942,	  
whilst	  British	  military	  ‘experts’	  were	  awaiting	  a	  renewed	  German	  offensive	  with	  something	  
approaching	  trepidation.	  ‘In	  their	  imaginations’,	  Wells	  maintained,	  the	  German	  military	  
is	   perfect	   in	   its	   equipment	   and	   invincible	   in	   discipline.	   Sometimes	   it	   is	   to	   strike	   a	  
decisive	  ‘blow’	  through	  Spain	  and	  North	  Africa	  and	  on,	  or	  march	  through	  the	  Balkans,	  
march	  from	  the	  Danube	  to	  Ankara,	  to	  Persia,	  to	  India,	  or	  ‘crush	  Russia’,	  or	  ‘pour	  over	  
the	  Brenner	  into	  Italy’.45	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  According	  to	  Wells	  this	  persistent	  defeatism	  was	  political	  rather	  than	  military	  in	  origin;	  it	  
was	  the	  propaganda	  of	  a	  ruling	  elite	  who	  sensed	  an	  existential	  threat	  in	  a	  British	  victory	  over	  
Germany,	  and	  wished	  to	  avert	  it.	  As	  such	  it	  was	  an	  interpretation	  of	  matters	  grounded	  in	  a	  
particularly	   Wellsian	   view	   of	   humanity’s	   fundamental	   predicament,	   and	   of	   how	   best	   to	  
address	  it.	  Since	  the	  late-­‐nineteenth	  century,	  Wells	  had	  been	  advocating	  the	  establishment	  
of	   a	   world	   state	   committed	   to	   the	   government	   of	   humankind	   as	   a	   whole.46	  Only	   through	  
such	  a	  revolutionary	  transformation,	  he	  believed,	  could	  humanity	  emancipate	  itself	  from	  the	  
dead	   hand	   of	   ignorance	   and	   tradition,	   and	   enter	   a	   new	   era	   characterized	   by	   the	   rational	  
pursuit	   of	   social	   justice.	   And	   now,	   in	   the	   spring	   of	   1941,	   he	   sensed	   that	   the	  moment	   for	  
decisive	   action	   had	   arrived,	   that	   British	   resistance	   to	   Hitler	   represented	   a	   revolutionary	  
opportunity—if	  only	  people	  could	  be	  made	  to	  see	  it.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  For	  Wells	  the	  measures	  necessary	  to	  exploit	  the	  situation	  were	  both	  military	  and	  political	  
in	  character.	  Britain	  must	  pressurize	  Germany	  by	  means	  of	  a	  powerful	  military	  and	  economic	  
counter-­‐offensive.	   The	   object	   was	   not	   to	   destroy	   outright	   the	   Nazi	   war	   machine,	   but	   to	  
convince	  the	  people	  of	  Germany	  and	  occupied	  Europe	  that	  Hitler	  could	  never	  win	  the	  war.	  
Meanwhile	  there	  should	  be	  a	  clear	  articulation	  of	  political	  goals	  designed	  to	  inspire	  popular	  
resistance	  against	  Nazism.	  Britain,	  he	  contended,	  must	  claim	  for	  itself	  the	  role	  of	  vanguard	  in	  
the	   world	   revolution;	   by	   its	   own	   actions	   it	   must	   seek	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   defeat	   of	  
Nazism	  was	  the	  first	  step	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  better	  world	  for	  all.47	  Hence	  the	  subtitle	  of	  his	  
1941	  collection:	  A	  Handbook	  of	  Constructive	  World	  Revolution.	  None	  of	  this	  looked	  likely	  to	  
happen	  any	  time	  soon	  however.	  Not	  only	  was	  the	  official	  mood	  one	  of	  pesimism	  in	  relation	  
to	  military	  matters,	  but	  no	  public	  articulation	  of	  war	  aims	  was	  forthcoming.	  This	  encouraged	  
Wells	   to	   conclude	   that	   he	   had	   uncovered	   a	   conspiracy.	   British	   passivity	   was,	   he	   argued,	  
symptomatic	   of	   establishment	   hostility	   towards	   his	   postwar	   vision	   of	   world	   revolution,	  
rather	  than	  a	  dispassionate	  analysis	  of	  military	  factors.	  Those	  who	  pronounced	  themselves	  
fearful	  of	  a	  renewed	  German	  offensive	  were	  the	  very	  people	  who	  had	  most	  to	  lose	  from	  the	  
emergence	  of	  a	  new	  world	  order.	  Their	  ploy	  was	  to	  reach	  an	  accommodation	  with	  Hitler—a	  
‘propitiary	  peace’—as	  soon	  as	  possible,	  so	  as	  to	  stop	  the	  war	  and	  preserve	  existing	  political	  
arrangements	  along	  with	  their	  own	  privileged	  positions	  therein.	  The	  problem	  here	  was	  that	  
a	  compromise	  peace	  would	  be	  acceptable	  to	  the	  British	  people	  only	  if	  they	  were	  persuaded	  
that	  continuing	  the	  war	  would	  expose	  them	  to	  a	  new	  and	  terrible	  series	  of	  German	  blows.	  
Hitler’s	  military	  strength	  therefore	  had	  to	  be	  greatly	  exaggerated,	  which	  explained	  the	  spate	  
of	  publically	  articulated	  defeatism	  that	  Wells	  believed	  he	  had	  detected.48	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  Orwell	  responded	  to	  this	  rather	  convoluted	  thesis	  with	  his	  broadside	  of	  an	  essay,	  ‘Wells,	  
Hitler	  and	  the	  World	  State’,	  which	  appeared	  in	  the	  August	  1941	  issue	  of	  Horizon.	  According	  
to	  John	  Partington,	   it	  was	  destined	  to	   inflict	   lasting	  damage	  on	  Wells’s	  status	  as	  a	  political	  
thinker.49	  The	  basis	  of	  Orwell’s	  critique	  was	  that	  Wells	  had	  failed	  to	  move	  with	  the	  times;	  he	  
remained	   too	   much	   the	   nineteenth-­‐century	   liberal	   to	   comprehend	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  
powerful	   social	   forces	   that	   fascism	   had	   lately	   succeeded	   in	   tapping.	   Hitler	   might	   be	   a	  
‘criminal	   lunatic’,	  but	  for	   ‘his	  sake	  a	  great	  nation	  has	  been	  willing	  to	  overwork	   itself	   for	  six	  
years	  and	  then	  to	  fight	  for	  two	  years	  more’.	  This	  was	  because	  Hitler	  understood	  something	  
that	   Wells	   did	   not:	   ‘that	   nationalism,	   religious	   bigotry	   and	   feudal	   loyalty	   are	   far	   more	  
powerful	   forces	   than	   what	   he	   himself	   would	   describe	   as	   sanity.’	   Moreover,	   Hitler	   had	  
demonstrated	   that	   the	  Wellsian	   ‘equation	   of	   science	  with	   common	   sense	   does	   not	   really	  
hold	   good’,	   that	   technical	   progress	   and	   reactionary	   war-­‐mongering	   were	   not	   mutually	  
exclusive	   activities.	   Far	   from	   recasting	   politics	   in	   accordance	   with	   its	   own	   rational	  
foundations,	   therefore,	   science	  was	  now	  being	  harnessed	   to	   the	  nihilistic	   creed	  of	  Nazism	  
with	  potentially	  terrible	  consequences.50	  
	  	  	  	  	  To	  set	  against	   these	   forces	  Wells	  had	  only	  his	   rather	  abstract	  vision	  of	  a	  world	  state,	   in	  
pursuit	  of	  which	  ‘hardly	  a	  human	  creature	  is	  willing	  to	  shed	  a	  pint	  of	  blood’	  because	  it	  was	  
really	   not	   the	   kind	   of	   project	   capable	   of	   galvanizing	   an	   emotional	   response.51	  ‘When	   it	  
comes	  to	  the	  pinch,	  human	  beings	  are	  heroic’,	  claimed	  Orwell,	  ‘and	  leaders	  who	  offer	  blood,	  
toil,	  tears	  and	  sweat	  always	  get	  more	  out	  of	  their	  followers	  than	  those	  who	  offer	  safety	  and	  
a	   good	   time.’ 52 	  Accordingly,	   Wells’s	   prescriptions	   provided	   no	   sound	   basis	   for	   British	  
strategy.	   German	  morale	   would	   not	   be	   seriously	   undermined	   by	  military	   action	   designed	  
merely	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  Hitler	  could	  not	  win	  the	  war.	  Nor	  would	  a	  British	  declaration	  of	  
‘constructive’	  revolutionary	  intent	  serve	  to	  incite	  mass	  resistance	  to	  the	  Nazis	  in	  Germany	  or	  
occupied	  Europe.	  And	   just	   in	  case	  anyone	  believed	  that	  Hitler’s	  military	  power	  was	   indeed	  
on	   the	  wane,	   the	  summer	  months	  of	  1941	  had	  witnessed	  exactly	   that	   renewal	  of	  German	  
offensive	   activity	   that	   Wells	   had	   insisted	   could	   not	   take	   place.	   In	   August	   it	   was	   barely	  
necessary	  for	  Orwell	  to	  point	  out	  that	  
the	  German	  Army	  has	  overrun	  the	  Balkans	  and	  reconquered	  Cyrenaica,	   it	  can	  march	  
through	  Turkey	  or	  Spain	  at	  such	  time	  as	  may	  suit	  it,	  and	  it	  has	  undertaken	  the	  invasion	  
of	   Russia	  …	   So	  much	   for	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   German	   army	   is	   a	   bogey,	   its	   equipment	  
inadequate,	  its	  morale	  breaking	  down,	  etc.	  etc.53	  
Winning	  the	  war,	  concluded	  Orwell,	  required	  the	  destruction	  of	  Hitler’s	  regime.	  An	  appeal	  to	  
reason,	   as	   Wells	   understood	   this	   term,	   would	   gain	   no	   traction	   with	   the	   Germany’s	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leadership	   or	   its	   people.	   As	   such,	  Wells	   possessed	   no	   realistic	   solution	   to	   the	   problem	   of	  
total	  war.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  This	  was	  harsh	   criticism	  but,	   in	   relation	   to	  Wells’s	   arguments,	   it	  was	  not	  unreasonable.	  
The	  claim	   that	  humanity	  might	  unite	  under	   the	  banners	  of	   science	  and	   reason	  was	   simply	  
unrealistic	   as	   a	   response	   to	   the	   Second	   World	   War,	   when	   the	   world	   was	   becoming	  
increasingly	   divided	   by	   nationalism	   and	   ideological	   differences.	   It	  was	  Orwell’s	   pessimistic	  
vision	  of	  the	  future,	  with	  its	  power	  blocs	  and	  Cold	  War	  confrontation,	  that	  was	  more	  in	  turn	  
with	  the	  new	  spirit	  of	  the	  age.	  
	  
Liddell	  Hart	  
Readers	  may	   be	   surprised	   to	   learn	   that	   Orwell’s	   critique	   of	  Wells	   was	   endorsed	   by	   none	  
other	   than	   Basil	   Liddell	   Hart.	   Throughout	   his	   extensive	   writings,	   Liddell	   Hart	   had	   always	  
displayed	  a	  profound	  faith	   in	  the	  capacity	  of	  reason	  to	  solve	  problems	  of	  military	  strategy.	  
One	   might,	   therefore,	   have	   expected	   them	   to	   be	   natural	   allies,	   and	   Wells	   did	   indeed	  
describe	  Liddell	  Hart	  as	  that	  ‘ablest	  authority	  upon	  the	  military	  outlook’.54	  Nevertheless,	  in	  a	  
letter	   to	   Horizon’s	   editor,	   Cyril	   Connolly,	   Liddell	   Hart	   pronounced	   Orwell’s	   essay	   ‘good	  
criticism,	  and	  all	   the	  better	   for	  being	  so	  well-­‐balanced	  on	   the	  whole.’55	  He	  did	  not	  contact	  
Orwell	  himself	  on	  the	  matter,	  however,	  and	  another	  year	  went	  by	  before	  they	  struck	  up	  a	  
correspondence	  and	  resolved	  to	  meet.56	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  meeting	  evidently	  took	  place	  at	  the	  Park	  Lane	  Hotel	  in	  September	  1942,	  with	  Osbert	  
Sitwell	  in	  attendance.57	  	  It	  did	  not	  go	  entirely	  smoothly.	  Orwell	  was	  unimpressed	  by	  what	  he	  
perceived	  to	  be	  Liddell	  Hart’s	  luke-­‐warm	  commitment	  to	  winning	  the	  war,	  and	  they	  argued	  
about	  the	  merits	  of	  bombing	  German	  cities.	   In	  his	  diary	  entry	  for	  the	  following	  day,	  Orwell	  
recorded	  his	  impressions	  of	  Liddell	  Hart	  in	  no	  uncertain	  terms.	  
Very	   defeatist	   and	   even,	   in	   my	   judgement,	   somewhat	   inclined	   to	   be	   pro-­‐German	  
subjectively.	  In	  a	  great	  stew	  about	  the	  barbarism	  of	  bombing	  Lübeck.	  Considered	  that	  
during	   the	   wars	   of	   recent	   centuries	   the	   British	   have	   the	   worst	   record	   of	   all	   for	  
atrocities	   and	  destructiveness.	  Although,	   of	   course,	   strongly	   opposed	   to	   the	   Second	  
Front,	  also	  anxious	  for	  us	  to	  call	  off	  the	  bombing.	  There	  is	  no	  point	  in	  doing	  it,	  as	  it	  can	  
achieve	  nothing	  and	  does	  not	  weaken	  Germany.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  
have	  started	  bombing	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (he	  stuck	  to	  it	  that	  it	  was	  we	  who	  started	  it),	  as	  
it	  merely	  brought	  heavier	  reprisals	  on	  ourselves.58	  
The	  Park	  Lane	  encounter	  also	  stuck	   in	  Liddell	  Hart’s	  mind	   long	  after	   it	  had	  taken	  place.	  As	  
late	  as	  1968	  he	  was	  writing	  with	  evident	   feeling	  on	   the	  matter	   to	  Frederick	  Warburg	  who	  
had	   recently	   published	   a	   four-­‐volume	   collection	   of	   Orwell’s	   writings. 59 	  The	   collection	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included	   Orwell’s	   account	   of	   their	   meeting	   (with	   the	   pro-­‐German	   comments	   happily	  
redacted)	  and	  Liddell	  Hart	  yet	  remained	  keen	  to	  put	  his	  own	  gloss	  on	  events.	  
Orwell’s	  diary	  note	  …	  about	  his	  meeting	  with	  me	  and	  Osbert	  Sitwell	  of	   the	  previous	  
day,	   showed	  how	  dimly	  he	  understood	  what	  we	  were	  both	   saying	  about	   the	  British	  
bombing	   campaign,	   and	   how	   he	   mis-­‐understood	   that	   when	   I	   was	   then	   expressing	  
myself	   as	   ‘opposed	   to	   the	   Second	   Front’,	   I	   was	   speaking	   of	   the	   near	   future—for	   a	  
landing	   in	   France	   in	   1942	  would	   have	   been	   suicidal,	   one	   in	   1943	   very	   dubious,	   and	  
even	  when	  it	  was	  eventually	  launched	  in	  June,	  1944	  it	  was	  ‘touch	  and	  go’	  for	  several	  
days	  before	  we	  succeeded	  in	  establishing	  an	  adequate	  bridgehead…60	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	   at	   least	   one	   important	   respect	   Orwell	   had	   matters	   wrong:	   Liddell	   Hart	   was	   not	  
subjectively	   pro-­‐German.	   He	   did,	   however,	   deplore	   the	   idea	   of	   total	   war	   as	   a	  monstrous	  
waste	  of	  people	  and	  resources,	  and	  a	  threat	  to	  Britain’s	  liberal	   ideals.	  He	  had	  long	  worried	  
that	   another	   European	   war	   would	   see	   Britain	   once	   again	   raising	   a	   large	   conscript	   army	  
whose	   bloody	   fate	   would	   be	   to	   reprise	   the	   Somme	   and	   Passchendaele	   offensives.	  When	  
Britain	  returned	  to	  conscription	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  he	  regarded	  it	  as	  a	  self-­‐
defeating	  move,	  because	  the	  sacrifices	  entailed	  were	  likely	  to	  erode	  popular	  support	  for	  the	  
war.	   Sustaining	   the	   national	  war	   effort	   over	   the	   long	   term,	   he	   believed,	   actually	   required	  
that	  peacetime	  conditions	  be	  preserved	  as	   far	  as	  practicable	  so	  as	  not	   to	  push	  people	   too	  
quickly	  beyond	  the	  bounds	  of	  their	  endurance.	  Moreover,	  whilst	  state	  compulsion	  had	  not	  
yet	  precipitated	  a	  British	  dictatorship,	  it	  had	  laid	  foundations	  that	  might	  quickly	  be	  built	  on	  
should	  the	  existing	  government	  be	  replaced	  by	  one	  less	  concerned	  to	  preserve	  democratic	  
institutions.	  Britain	  was,	  therefore,	  playing	  fast	  and	  loose	  with	  	  
the	   cardinal	   principle	   of	   a	   free	   community:	   that	   there	   should	   be	   no	   restriction	   on	  
individual	   freedom	   save	   where	   this	   is	   used	   for	   active	   intereference	   with	   others’	  
freedom.	  Our	  tradition	  of	  individual	  freedom	  is	  the	  slow-­‐ripening	  fruit	  of	  centuries	  of	  
effort.	  To	  surrender	  it	  within	  after	  fighting	  to	  defend	  it	  against	  dangers	  without	  would	  
be	  a	  supremely	  ironical	  turn	  of	  our	  history.61	  
It	   was	   in	   this	   spirit	   that	   Liddell	   Hart	   entertained	   doubts	   about	   returning	   to	   the	   European	  
continent	   in	   force.	   Likewise	   he	   believed	   that	   city	   bombing	   was	   a	   pointless	   and	   counter-­‐
productive	   exercise,	   prompted	   by	   the	   faulty	   logic	   of	   total	   war.	   It	   actually	   did	   nothing	   to	  
hinder	  the	  German	  war	  effort,	  and	  therefore	  succeeded	  only	  in	  inciting	  retaliation	  in	  kind.	  As	  
such,	  bombing	  multiplied	  human	  suffering	   to	  no	  good	  end.	  Ultimately,	   therefore,	   if	   Liddell	  
Hart	   sometimes	  seemed	  to	  be	  accusing	  his	  own	  side	  of	  provoking	  Hitler,	   it	  was	  not	  out	  of	  
sympathy	  for	  the	  Nazi	  regime	  but	  out	  of	   frustration	  with	  what	  he	  perceived	  to	  be	  his	  own	  
side’s	  wrecklessness.62	  
	  	  	  	  	  These	  arguments	  had	  much	  in	  common	  with	  the	  pacifist	  critique	  of	  total	  war,	  just	  as	  they	  
shared	  the	  concerns	  of	  those	  opposed	  to	  city	  bombing.	  But	  Liddell	  Hart	  was	  not	  a	  pacifist;	  he	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entertained	   grave	   reservations	   about	   the	   political	   utility	   of	   force	   but	   he	   never	   entirely	  
rejected	   it.	  Much	  of	  his	   thinking	  was,	   in	   fact,	  directed	   towards	   identifying	  a	   liberal	  middle	  
way	   between	   whole-­‐hearted	   commitment	   to	   war	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   whole-­‐hearted	  
rejection	  of	  it	  on	  the	  other.63	  And	  it	  was	  on	  the	  feasibility	  of	  this	  middle	  way	  that	  Liddell	  Hart	  
and	  Orwell	  would	  have	  a	  second	  major	  difference	  of	  opinion.	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  their	  meeting,	  Liddell	  Hart	  sent	  Orwell	  a	  copy	  of	  his	  book,	  The	  British	  Way	  
in	   Warfare.	   Originally	   published	   ten	   years	   previously,	   it	   had	   recently	   been	   re-­‐issued	   by	  
Penguin	  in	  revised	  form.64	  This	  was	  Liddell	  Hart	  seeking	  to	  continue	  their	  previous	  argument	  
by	  other	  means.	  The	  British	  Way	  contains	  as	  its	  first	  chapter	  a	  short	  essay	  on	  what	  its	  author	  
termed	  the	  ‘historic	  strategy	  of	  Britain’.	  From	  the	  sixteenth	  century	  down	  to	  the	  First	  World	  
War,	  he	  argued,	  Britain	  had	  pursued	  a	  strategy	  of	  ‘limited	  war’.	  This	  involved	  employing	  her	  
seapower	  against	  the	  economic	  foundations	  of	  an	  adversary’s	  war	  effort,	  by	  choking	  off	  its	  
maritime	  commerce	  and	  sweeping	  up	  its	  overseas	  colonies.	  When	  conducted	  in	  concert	  with	  
suitable	   Continental	   allies,	   the	   strategy	   permitted	   Britain	   to	   exercise	   a	   powerful	   influence	  
over	  European	  politics	  without	  having	   to	  put	  a	   large	  army	   into	   the	   field.	  An	  expeditionary	  
force	   might	   upon	   occasion	   be	   landed	   by	   the	   navy	   at	   some	   weak	   spot	   on	   an	   enemy’s	  
periphery,	  causing	  disruption	  out	  of	  all	  proportion	  to	  its	  size.	  But	  this	  was	  the	  limit	  of	  British	  
ambitions	  as	  far	  as	  land	  warfare	  was	  concerned.	  Economy	  of	  effort	  was	  the	  key	  principle	  in	  
this	  latter	  regard.	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  Liddell	  Hart’s	  view,	  it	  was	  Britain’s	  departure	  from	  this	  traditional	  strategy,	  in	  favour	  of	  
raising	  a	  mass	  army	  for	  major	  operations	  on	  the	  Continent,	  that	  led	  to	  the	  terrible	  casualties	  
and	   ruinous	   costs	   of	   the	   First	  World	  War.	   Had	   Britain	  maintained	   its	  maritime	   posture,	   it	  
would	  not	  have	  suffered	  such	  crippling	  losses.	  It	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  blockade	  Germany	  
whilst	  mounting	  diversionary	  raids	  that	  reduced	  pressure	  on	  the	  French	  army.	  It	  might	  also	  
have	  been	  possible	   to	  open	  better	  supply	   lines	   to	  Russia,	   thereby	  ameliorating	   the	   latter’s	  
chronic	   logistical	   problems.	   If	   German	   resistance	   had	   not	   altogether	   collapsed	   in	  
consequence,	  a	  negotiated	  settlement	  would	  have	  permitted	  an	  end	  to	  the	  war	  at	  far	  lower	  
cost	  than	  was	  actually	  the	  case.	  As	  such,	  The	  British	  Way	  was	  part	  of	  Liddell	  Hart’s	  campaign	  
to	  resurrect	  this	  maritime	  strategy,	  thereby	  limiting	  Britain’s	  commitment	  to	  any	  future	  war	  
in	  Europe.	  He	  revised	  successive	  editions	  of	  the	  book	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  the	  changing	  
circumstances	  of	  the	  war,	  but	  the	  central	  message	  remained	  the	  same:	  Britain	  should	  avoid	  
the	  dangers	  of	  total	  war	  by	  adopting	  a	  limited,	  maritime	  strategy.	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  due	  course,	  Orwell	  produced	  a	  review	  of	  the	  book	  for	  The	  New	  Statesman	  and	  Nation.	  
He	   had	   evidently	   read	   Liddell	   Hart’s	   opening	   chapter	   with	   care,	   and	   considered	   it	   an	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important	   contribution	   to	   the	   debate	   on	   the	   future	   direction	   of	   British	   strategy.	   He	  
therefore	  chose	  to	  engage	  with	  it	  in	  some	  detail.	  For	  one	  thing,	  Orwell	  was	  skeptical	  about	  
the	   effectiveness	   of	   a	   naval	   blockade	   under	   contemporary	   technical	   conditions.	   He	  
considered	  that	  the	  mission	  had	  been	  made	  more	  difficult	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  marine	  
mine,	  whilst	   Germany’s	   ability	   to	  manufacture	   substitutes	   for	   raw	  materials	   she	   could	   no	  
longer	   import	  also	  undermined	  the	  blockade’s	  effectiveness.	  The	  real	  problem	  with	  Liddell	  
Hart’s	  prescriptions,	  however,	  was	  more	  in	  the	  political	  line.	  More	  specifically	  it	  lay	  in	  his	  
unwillingness	   to	   admit	   that	   war	   has	   changed	   its	   character.	   ‘Limited	   Aims’	   strategy	  
implies	  that	  your	  enemy	  is	  very	  much	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  person	  as	  yourself;	  you	  want	  
to	  get	   the	  better	  of	  him,	  but	   it	   is	  not	  necessary	   for	  your	   safety	   to	  annihilate	  him	  or	  
even	  to	  interfere	  with	  his	  internal	  politics.	  
Whilst	   these	   conditions	   had	   been	   a	   feature	   of	   the	   eighteenth-­‐century	   outlook,	   the	  
ideologically	   opposed	  belligerents	  of	   the	  mid-­‐twentieth	   century	   took	  a	  decidedly	  different	  
view	   of	   each	   other.	   ‘As	   Mussolini	   has	   truly	   said,’	   continued	   Orwell,	   ‘democracy	   and	  
totalitarianism	   cannot	   exist	   side	   by	   side.’	   It	   followed	   from	   this	   that	   the	   range	   of	   Britain’s	  
strategic	   options	   were	   far	   narrower	   than	   Liddell	   Hart	   evidently	   realized.	   ‘Our	   survival’,	  
Orwell	   concluded,	   ‘depends	   on	   the	   destruction	   of	   the	   present	   German	   political	   system,	  
which	   implies	   the	  destruction	  of	   the	  German	  army.’65	  If	  Liddell	  Hart	  could	  not	  credit	   this	   it	  
was	  because	  of	  his	  earnest	  desire	  to	  avoid	  another	  Passchendaele,	  which	  was	  blinkering	  his	  
judgement.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Orwell’s	  review	  elicited	  both	  a	  private	  letter	  and	  a	  published	  response	  from	  Liddell	  Hart.	  
In	  the	  first	  of	  these	  he	  was	  concerned	  to	  explain	  that	  his	  discussion	  of	  strategy	  in	  The	  British	  
Way	  had	  originally	  been	  written	  in	  1931	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  events	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  
As	   such	   it	   had	   never	   been	   intended	   as	   a	   prescription	   for	   future	   action	   in	   relation	   to	  
Germany.	  It	  was	  only	  when	  he	  had	  received	  the	  proofs	  of	  the	  new	  Penguin	  edition	  that	  he	  
had	   spotted	   the	   potential	   for	   confusion,	   by	   which	   point	   he	   was	   no	   longer	   able	   to	   make	  
significant	   revisions. 66 	  In	   his	   published	   response	   Liddell	   Hart	   suggested	   that	   technical	  
developments	  did	  indeed	  necessitate	  some	  revisions	  to	  the	  strategy	  of	  limited	  war,	  but	  that	  
Orwell	  was	  nevertheless	  wrong	   to	   argue	   for	   its	  wholesale	   abandonment	   in	   the	   face	  of	   an	  
ideological	   opponent.	   Indeed	   the	   strategy	   had	   first	   been	   developed	   during	   the	   sixteenth	  
century	  in	  response	  to	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  Catholic	  Spain.67	  If	  it	  worked	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
pronounced	   confessional	   differences	   of	   those	   days,	   he	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   suggesting,	   it	  
ought	  to	  work	  in	  the	  context	  of	  contemporary	  ideological	  differences.	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  problem	  here	  was	  Liddell	  Hart’s	  inability	  to	  comprehend	  just	  how	  different	  Hitler	  was	  
from	   Britain’s	   previous	   enemies.	   He	   could	   never	   quite	   bring	   himself	   to	   admit	   that	   Nazi	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Germany	  was	  under	  the	  spell	  of	  a	  fanatic	  whose	  scale	  of	  values	  was	  not	  remotely	  congruent	  
with	   his	   own.	   His	   sense	   of	   the	   matter	   was	   that	   all	   aggressors	   are	   carefully	   calculating	  
individuals	   who	   seeking	   to	   gain	   something	   from	   war.	   Thus	   they	   can	   be	   induced	   to	   seek	  
peace	   so	   long	   as	   these	   gains	   are	   denied	   them,	   and	   they	   are	   not	   confronted	   with	   the	  
prospect	  of	  losing	  something	  important	  in	  the	  process.	  He	  therefore	  believed	  it	  strategically	  
important	  to	  guard	  against	   the	  error	  of	   treating	  the	   latest	  enemy	  as	  a	  departure	  from	  this	  
pattern.	  	  	  
It	  is	  a	  recurrent	  illusion	  of	  history	  that	  the	  enemy	  of	  the	  time	  is	  essentially	  different	  in	  
the	   sense	   of	   being	   more	   evil,	   than	   any	   in	   the	   past.	   We,	   for	   example,	   felt	   that	  
conviction	   when	   fighting	   Spain	   in	   the	   sixteenth	   and	   seventeenth	   centuries,	   when	  
fighthing	   the	   France	   of	   Louis	   XIV	   early	   in	   the	   eighteenth	   century,	   when	   fighting	  
Revolutionary	  France	  at	   the	  end	  of	   that	   century,	   and	  also	  when	   fighting	  Napoleonic	  
France	  in	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century.68	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  That	   Orwell’s	   grasp	   of	   the	   political	   and	   strategic	   situation	   confronting	   Britain	   was	  
sounder	  than	  Liddell	  Hart’s	  hardly	  needs	  bringing	  out.	  It	  was	  Orwell	  who	  correctly	  perceived	  
the	   ‘rigidity’	   of	   Hitler’s	   mind—his	   determination	   to	   achieve	   the	   goal	   of	   a	   transcendent	  
Germany	  that	  he	  had	  articulated	  in	  Mein	  Kampf,	  and	  the	  consistency	  of	  his	  actions	  in	  pursuit	  
of	   it.	  Hitler’s	  was	  ‘the	  fixed	  vision	  of	  a	  monomaniac;	  and	  not	   likely	  to	  be	  much	  affected	  by	  
the	  temporary	  manœuvres	  of	  power	  politics.’69	  He	  was	  not,	  in	  other	  words,	  somebody	  who	  
could	  be	  coerced	  into	  passivity	  by	  a	  British	  strategy	  predicated	  merely	  on	  generating	  heavy	  
military	   costs	   for	   his	   intransigence.	   He	   would	   either	   lead	   Germany	   to	   victory	   over	   its	  
enemies,	  or	  see	  it	  destroyed	  in	  the	  attempt.	  Indeed	  Hitler’s	  own	  explanation	  for	  his	  ultimate	  
downfall	  reflected	  just	  such	  a	  mind-­‐set.	  His	  mistake,	  he	  believed,	  was	  not	  his	   insistence	  on	  
war	  so	  much	  as	  his	  failure	  to	  start	  it	  in	  1938	  when	  circumstances	  had	  been	  more	  favourable	  
to	  Germany	   than	   they	  would	   subsequently	  be.70	  Such	  an	  attitude	  was	  not	  one	   that	   Liddell	  
Hart	  could	  ever	  really	  grasp.	  
	  
Conclusion:	  a	  sesne	  of	  reality	  
As	   we	   have	   seen,	   Orwell’s	   views	   on	   the	   strategic	   conduct	   of	   the	   Second	   World	   War	  
stemmed	   partly	   from	   his	   determination	   to	   uphold	   the	   claims	   of	   reason	   in	   the	   face	   of	  
unproblematized	  sentiment.	  His	  position	  on	  pacifism	  and	  city	  bombing	  alike	   resulted	   from	  
his	  efforts	  to	  evaluate	  these	  matters	  in	  a	  rigorously	  intellectual	  manner.	  Because	  there	  is	  a	  
necessary	  relationship	  between	  politics	  and	  force,	  pacifism	  cannot	  be	  a	  defensible	  choice	  for	  
citizens	  of	  a	  state	  at	  war.	  If	  one	  soberly	  considers	  the	  demographics	  of	  bombing	  casualties,	  
and	  compares	  them	  across	  different	  forms	  of	  warfare,	  air	  raids	  emerge	  as	  relatively	  rational	  
and	  humane.	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  But	   Orwell	   was	   also	   perceptive	   enough	   to	   appreciate	   that	   liberal-­‐hedonic	   calculations	  
were	  not,	  in	  themselves,	  a	  sure	  guide	  to	  strategy.	  Much	  also	  depended	  on	  the	  character	  of	  
the	  opposition,	  along	  with	  the	  values	  they	  brought	  to	  the	  struggle.	  And	  in	  this	  respect	  it	  was	  
Orwell’s	  shrewd	  grasp	  of	  the	  wider	  political	  mood	  of	  his	  day,	  his	  feel	  for	  the	  general	  course	  
of	   world	   events	   and	   what	   they	   entailed	   for	   Britain,	   that	   made	   his	   strategic	   views	   so	  
perspicacious.	  Orwell	  himself	  articulated	  this	  point	  in	  one	  of	  his	  diary	  entries	  for	  1940.	  
Stephen	  Spender	  said	  to	  me	  recently,	  ‘Don’t	  you	  feel	  that	  any	  time	  during	  the	  past	  ten	  
years	   you	  have	  been	  able	   to	   foretell	   events	  better	   than,	   say,	   the	  Cabinet?’	   I	   had	   to	  
agree	  to	  this.	  Partly	   it	   is	  a	  question	  of	  not	  being	  blinded	  by	  class	  interests	  etc.	  …	  But	  
where	  I	  feel	  that	  people	  like	  us	  understand	  the	  situation	  better	  than	  so-­‐called	  experts	  
is	  not	  in	  any	  power	  to	  foretell	  specific	  events,	  but	  in	  the	  power	  to	  grasp	  what	  kind	  of	  
world	  we	  are	  living	  in.71	  
Experts	   in	   military	   matters	   had	   their	   place,	   but	   their	   specialization	   meant	   they	   were	  
‘generally	  right	  on	  the	  minor	  points	  and	  wrong	  on	  the	  major	  ones.’72	  Consequently	  
a	  poet	  or	  philosopher	  who	  does	  not	  even	  know	  how	  to	  load	  a	  .303	  rifle,	  but	  who	  does	  
at	   least	   know	   something	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   Fascism,	   is	   a	   better	   guide	   to	   grand	  
strategy	   than	  an	  elderly	   soldier	  who	  has	   given	  his	   life	   to	   the	   study	  of	  war	  but	  who,	  
politically	  and	  philosophically,	  has	  learnt	  nothing	  since	  1918.73	  	  
Orwell,	   in	   other	   words,	   possessed	   what	   Isaiah	   Berlin	   famously	   described	   as	   ‘a	   sense	   of	  
reality’—a	  capacity	   to	   see	  beyond	  what	  was	  most	  obvious	  and	  generic	   about	   the	   times	   in	  
which	   he	   lived,	   to	   glimpse	   something	   of	   its	  more	   fundamental	   and	   unique	   (if	   sometimes	  
ineffable)	   qualities,	   and	   to	   appreciate	   what	   these	   latter	   qualities	   meant	   for	   one’s	   own	  
freedom	  of	  action	  at	  a	  political	  and	  strategic	   level.74	  It	  was	   just	  this	  capacity	  that	  equipped	  
him	   to	  appreciate	  what	   it	  was	  necessary	   to	  do,	  and	   reasonable	   to	   risk,	   in	   response	   to	   the	  
threat	  posed	  by	  Hitler’s	  Germany.	  Orwell’s	  synoptic	  vision	  of	  the	  world,	  with	  its	  rising	  tide	  of	  
totalitarianism	   whose	   ways	   he	   intuited	   so	   thoroughly,	   alerted	   him	   to	   the	   necessity	   of	  
extreme	  efforts.	  Pacifists	  might	  warn	  that	  to	  fight	  Hitler	  was	  to	  become	  him,	  and	  opponents	  
of	  city	  bombing	  might	  argue	  that	   it	   risked	  destroying	  the	  moral	   foundations	  of	  any	  society	  
that	   stooped	   to	   such	   practices.	   But	   Orwell	   was	   prepared	   to	   take	   such	   risks	   because	   he	  
perceived	  there	  was	  no	  real	  alternative.	  To	  accommodate	  Fascism	  was	  to	  acquiesce	   in	  the	  
terrible	  prospect	  of	  a	  night	  without	  end	  in	  Europe,	  and	  quite	  possibly	  the	  world	  at	  large.	  One	  
must	   therefore	   fight	  as	   fiercely	  as	  possible.	  Moreover,	  he	  was	  willing	   to	  bet	   (although	  not	  
certain)	  that	  the	  peculiar	  nature	  of	  British	  society—its	  liberal	  insularity—would	  shield	  it	  from	  
the	  worst	  consequences	  of	  its	  own	  actions	  in	  this	  regard,	  and	  that	  the	  excesses	  of	  wartime	  
would	  not	  carry	  over	  into	  the	  peace.	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  Unfortunately	   the	   same	   liberal	   reasonableness,	   which	   flourished	   in	   the	   benign	  
environment	  of	  insular	  Britain,	  and	  which	  evidently	  innoculated	  its	  people	  against	  European	  
political	   pathologies,	   also	   left	   them	   innocent	  of	   the	   vast	   reservoirs	  of	   popular	   energy	   that	  
nationalistic	  demagogues	  might	  mobilize	  for	  their	  own	  dark	  purposes.	  This	  was	  the	  problem	  
underlying	  the	  strategic	  prescriptions	  of	  Wells	  and	  Liddell	  Hart.	  The	  pair	  of	   them	  were	  too	  
English	  in	  their	  world	  view;	  they	  were	  willing	  to	  fight	  Germany	  but	  not	  to	  fight	  hard	  enough.	  
They	  could	  not	  credit	   the	  atavistic	  values	   that	  Hitler	  had	  stirred	  up	   in	   the	  German	  people.	  
Consequently	   their	   advocacy	   of	   coercive	   strategies	   designed	   to	   separate	   the	   people	   from	  
their	   Führer,	   or	   to	  manipulate	   his	   perception	   of	   risk,	  would	   not	  work.	   The	  war	   had	   to	   be	  
fought	  with	  a	  view	  to	  destroying	  Nazism,	  and	  this	  would	  involve	  an	  unstinting	  military	  effort	  
on	  Britain’s	  part.	  
	  	  	  	  	  As	   such,	   Orwell’s	   views	   on	   strategy	   reflect	   his	   broader	   political	   concerns	   of	   the	   1940s.	  
They	   recapitulate	   his	   desire	   to	   dispense	   with	   misplaced	   idealism	   about	   political	   matters,	  
without	   wholly	   acquiescing	   in	   the	   fashionable	   realism	   he	   so	   disdained,	   and	   which	   he	  
considered	   the	   road	   to	   totalitarianism.	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   his	   strategic	   prescriptions	  
succeeded	   in	  navigating	  a	  path	  between	   these	   two	  extremes,	   it	  was	  because	  he	  could	  see	  
the	  world	   as	   it	   was	   rather	   than	   how	   others	  might	  want	   it	   to	   be.	   To	   borrow	   a	   distinction	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